

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /057 W
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R 071424Z MAY 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3507
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
USLOSSACLANT NORFOLK VA
USNMR SHAPE BE
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NATO 02859

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MNUC, NPG, NATO
SUBJECT: NPG: AMBASSADOR PAULS REMARKS AT MAY 5 NPG
PERMREP MEETING

REF: USNATO 2782 (DTG 061401Z MAY 77)

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW IN PARA 2 AMBASSADOR PAULS'
(FRG) REMARKS MADE AT THE MAY 5 NPG PERMREP MEETING
REPORTED REFTEL.
2. BEGIN TEXT:

1. MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO WINTEX AND
OTHER EXERCISES. THESE EXERCISES OFFER THE ONLY OPPOR-
TUNITY FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TEST PROCEDURES ESPECIALLY IN
THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR CONSULTATION WHICH HAVE TO BE USED
IN TIMES OF TENSION.

THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE FRICTIONS OF A TYPE WHICH
CANNOT BE FORESEEN, AND THERE WILL ON THE OTHER HAND BE
KINDS OF FRICTIONS WHICH CAN BE FORESEEN BUT WHICH CANNOT
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BE EXERCISED FOR VARIOUS REASONS. IT IS ALL THE MORE
IMPORTANT TO EXERCISE THE FORESEEABLE ONES SO THAT WE DO
NOT RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES IN PERIODS OF TENSION.

2. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WINTEX EXERCISES ARE
ORGANIZED AS COMMAND POST EXERCISES (CPX), THEY ARE OF
GREAT IMPORTANCE NOT ONLY FROM A MILITARY BUT ALSO FROM

A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS PARTICULARLY DESIRABLE THAT AS MANY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES AS POSSIBLE SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE DPC MEETINGS. THE SAME APPLIES TO HIGH-RANKING CIVIL SERVANTS AND POLITICIANS IN CAPITALS AS WELL AS TO THE STAFFS OF MNC'S.

3. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT WINTEX 77 DESERVES TO BE SPECIFICALLY EMPHASIZED IN VIEW OF THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF THE EXERCISE PLAY. THE EXTENSIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE DPC ALSO PERMITTED AN INTENSIVE PLAY IN NATIONAL CAPITALS, OF WHICH GREAT USE WAS MADE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE NUCLEAR PHASE. THE SCENARIO, WHICH WAS COMPRESSED, NOT ALWAYS REALISTIC, AND HAD A MAINLY MILITARY ORIENTATION LEFT LITTLE ROOM FOR A REALISTIC POLITICAL PLAY. WE WOULD REGARD IT AS DANGEROUS TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS EXERCISE CONCERNING STRATEGY AND CONCEPT.

WE ALL KNOW WE ENTERED THE NUCLEAR PHASE AFTER ABOUT 48 HOURS. THIS RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE MIGHT GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE MANY THOUSAND OF PEOPLE IN THE ALLIANCE TAKING PART IN THE EXERCISE, THAT OUR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVES COLLAPSED AFTER 48 HOURS. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, DISCOURAGE THEM AND WOULD HAVE A DISASTROUS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.

WOULD IT NOT BE A BETTER IDEA TO PLAY THE CONVENTIONAL PART OF THE EXERCISE FOR A CERTAIN TIME, THEN TO JUMP A NUMBER OF DAYS - DURING WHICH CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVES WOULD THEORETICALLY HAVE CONTINUED - AND THEN TO ENTER THE NUCLEAR PHASE. WE SHOULD AVOID TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT WE UNDERESTIMATE OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES.

4. SACEUR'S ROMEO ONE CAN IN MY OPINION BE REGARDED AS EXEMPLARY OF A REQUEST FOR THE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; BOTH THE POLITICAL AND THE MILITARY JUSTIFICATION WAS DETAILED AND VERY CONVINCING:

- CHOICE OF THE TIMING OF INITIAL USE IN CONSIDERATION OF THE OVERALL POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC SITUATION;
- PARTICIPATION OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE RISK, USE NOT GEOGRAPHICALLY LIMITED, VARIOUS MEANS OF DELIVERY, WEAPON USE MAINLY ON WP TERRITORY, LIMITED COLLATERAL DAMAGE, AND INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEFORE NATO'S CONVENTIONAL POSSIBILITIES WERE EXHAUSTED.

5. THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO IS TO STOP THE ENEMY'S ATTACK AND TO ENTER INTO POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON A SETTLEMENT OF THE

CONFLICT. FOR THIS REASON, INITIAL USE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A CNI-MESSAGE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES SHOULD BE PRECISELY FOLLOWED. IN THE CASE OF CNI, THE TIMING IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE:

- BASICALLY, A DECISION ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRIOR TO THE DISPATCH OF A MESSAGE OF EXPLICIT WARNING;

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 NATO 02859

- AS A RULE, THE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD ANNOUNCE THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS CNI MEASURES AT THE LATEST DURING THE CONSULTATION ON A ROMEO MESSAGE;

- AFTER INITIAL USE FOLLOWED BY A MESSAGE OF INFORMATION, ADEQUATE TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO ELAPSE UNTIL THE NEXT FOLLOW-ON USE, IN ORDER TO GIVE THE ENEMY TIME AND OPPORTUNITY FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS ABOUT A DISCONTINUATION OF THE AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS. FOR THIS REASON THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION BETWEEN MNC'S IS REQUIRED IN REGARD TO THE TIMING OF INITIAL USE AND ANY FOLLOW-ON USE.

- UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THE WARNING FOLLOWING A CNI ACTION BE LESS EXPLICIT THAN THE PRECEDING ONE. IN THIS CASE AS WELL, THERE SHOULD BE AN ESCALATION OF THE TEXT, I.E. THE LANGUAGE SHOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY INSISTENT AND CLEAR.

6. SUBJECT TO THESE LIMITATIONS, HOWEVER, I THINK THAT
WE CAN SAY THAT THE OVERALL OBJECT OF THE EXERCISE HAS
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. END TEXT. BENNETT
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